Jada Twedt Strabbing
Associate Professor of Philosophy
313-577-7823
5057 Woodward Ave., 12th Floor, Room 12206.2
Jada Twedt Strabbing
Research
I specialize in moral philosophy, particularly agency and responsibility, moral psychology, and metaethics. My current research is on the nature of moral responsibility, blame, and forgiveness. I also work on ethical issues in the philosophy of religion.
Education
- Ph.D., Philosophy, Princeton University (2011)
- Certificate of Advanced Studies in Mathematics, University of Cambridge (2004)
- B.A., Philosophy and Psychology, University of Oxford (2003)
- B.A., Physics and Philosophy, Kenyon College (2001)
Selected publications
- "Blame and Blameworthy Presentation: A (Mostly) Ecumenical Account of Blame," Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 7 (2021), Oxford University Press, 205–228.
- "Forgiveness and Reconciliation," Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2020), 98 (3): 531–545.
- "Entwining Thomistic and Anselmian Interpretations of the Atonement," with Joshua Thurow, Faith and Philosophy (2020), 37 (4): 516–535.
- "Accountability and the Thoughts in Reactive Attitudes," Philosophical Studies (2019), 176 (12): 3121–3140.
- “Responsibility and Normative Moral Theories,” The Philosophical Quarterly (2018), 68 (272): 603–625.
- “Internalization and the Philosophers’ Best Interest in Plato’s Republic,” Apeiron (2018), 51 (2): 147–170.
- “Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” Faith and Philosophy (2017), 34 (3): 272–297.
- “Responsibility and Judgment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2016), 92 (3): 736–760.
- “Attributability, Weakness of Will, and the Importance of Just Having the Capacity,” Philosophical Studies (2016), 173 (2): 289–307.
- “The Permissibility of the Atonement as Penal Substitution,” in Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7 (2016), Oxford University Press, 239–270.
- “Review of D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini’s (eds.) Blame: Its Nature and Norms,” Mind (2014) 123 (490): 579–585.
- "Review of Andrew Sneddon's Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral Psychology," Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 2012.
- “Moral Obligation, Accountability, and Second-Personal Reasons,” with Michael Smith, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2010), 81 (1): 237–245.